
Nicholas P Koziolk

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Employment

2018–present	Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, Washington University in St. Louis
2016–18	Instructor, Department of Philosophy, Auburn University
2015–16	Preceptor, Master of Arts Program in the Humanities, University of Chicago
2015–16	Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago

Education

2015	Ph.D. in Philosophy, University of Chicago (Chicago, IL)
2010	M.A. in Philosophy, University of Chicago (Chicago, IL)
2008	M.Phil. in Philosophy, University of Cambridge (Cambridge, England)
2007	B.A. with Honors in Philosophy, <i>summa cum laude</i> , Colgate University (Hamilton, NY)

Specialization

AOS	Philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, epistemology
AOC	History of analytic philosophy, Kant, logic

Publications

1. “Belief as the Power to Judge,” forthcoming in *Topoi* (accepted November 14, 2018)
2. “Belief as an Act of Reason,” forthcoming in *Manuscripto* (accepted September 10, 2018)
3. “Inferring as a Way of Knowing,” *Synthese* (2017), <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1632-4>
4. “Extensionality, Indirect Contexts, and Frege’s Hierarchy,” *dialectica* 70.3 (2016), pp. 431–462

Work in progress

1. “Extensionality and the Composition of Thoughts”
2. “Coming to Believe”

Invited and Refereed Talks

Nov 2017	Agency and Actualization Canadian Society for Epistemology Conference
Sep 2017	Agency and Actualization Alabama Philosophical Society Conference

Jul 2017	Belief, Judgment, and Rational Explanation Logic and Life: Themes from the Work of Irad Kimhi, University of Leipzig
Jun 2016	Coming to Believe University of Potsdam
Jun 2016	Inferring as a Way of Knowing Leipzig Workshop on Reasoning, University of Leipzig
Apr 2016	Coming to Believe Epistemology Brown Bag, Northwestern University
Apr 2015	Inferring as a Way of Knowing Chicagoland Philosophy Graduate Conference, University of Illinois at Chicago
Dec 2014	Inferring as a Way of Knowing MindGrad '14 Graduate Philosophy Conference, University of Warwick
Nov 2014	Inferring as a Way of Knowing Northwest Philosophy Conference, Central Washington University
Jul 2014	Belief, Judgment, and Rational Explanation Graduate Conference on Knowing and Acting, University of Potsdam
Nov 2013	Does Frege Need Indirect Senses? Northern Graduate Philosophy Conference, Northern Illinois University
Oct 2013	Does Frege Need Indirect Senses? Northwest Philosophy Conference, Pacific University
Sep 2011	Thinking About Thought Philosophy Department Colloquium, Colgate University

Honors

2013–14	Affiliated Doctoral Fellow, Franke Institute for the Humanities, University of Chicago
2013–14	University of Chicago Provost's Dissertation Year Fellowship
2013	Award for Excellence in Course Design, University of Chicago
2009–13	Jacob K. Javits Fellowship
2008–13	University of Chicago Fellowship

Teaching Experience

As Instructor

Fall 2018	<i>Inquiry in the Cognitive Sciences</i> , Washington University in St. Louis Required methods course for majors in the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology program <i>Problems in Philosophy</i> (two sections), Washington University in St. Louis Introductory philosophy course for undergraduate students
Summer 2018	<i>Introduction to Ethics</i> (two sections), Auburn University Course for undergraduate students in the College of Liberal Arts
Spring 2018	<i>Business Ethics</i> (four sections), Auburn University Course for undergraduate students in the College of Liberal Arts
Fall 2017	<i>Business Ethics</i> (four sections), Auburn University Course for undergraduate students in the College of Liberal Arts

Summer 2017	<i>Business Ethics</i> (two sections), Auburn University Course for undergraduate students in the College of Liberal Arts
Spring 2017	<i>Business Ethics</i> (four sections), Auburn University Course for undergraduate students in the College of Liberal Arts
Fall 2016	<i>Business Ethics</i> (four sections), Auburn University Course for undergraduate students in the College of Liberal Arts
Spring 2016	<i>History of Philosophy III: Kant and the 19th Century</i> (co-taught with James Conant) Course from the required history sequence for undergraduate philosophy majors
Winter 2016	<i>Boredom and Repetition</i> , University of Chicago Course for both advanced undergraduates and students in the MA Program in the Humanities
Fall 2015	<i>Contemporary Analytic Philosophy</i> , University of Chicago Seminar for students in the MA Program in the Humanities
Winter 2015	<i>Philosophical Perspectives on the Humanities II</i> , University of Chicago Humanities Core course for first-year undergraduates, focusing on the early modern period
Fall 2014	<i>Contemporary Analytic Philosophy</i> , University of Chicago Seminar for students in the MA Program in the Humanities
Fall 2012	<i>Knowledge and the Concept of Mind</i> , University of Chicago Upper-level undergraduate seminar

As Course Assistant

Fall 2015	<i>Foundations of Interpretive Theory</i> , University of Chicago Course Assistant for Prof. Malynne Sternstein and Dr. Hilary Strang
Winter 2012	<i>Intermediate Logic</i> , University of Chicago Course Assistant for Prof. Michael Kremer
Fall 2011	<i>Elementary Logic</i> , University of Chicago Course Assistant for Prof. Malte Willer
Winter 2011	<i>History of Philosophy II: Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy</i> , University of Chicago Course Assistant for Dr. Benjamin Callard
Winter 2013	<i>Philosophical Perspectives on the Humanities II</i> , University of Chicago Writing Intern for Prof. Nathan Bauer Designed and led seminars on academic writing for first-year college students
Summer 2008	<i>Logic: Principles of Reasoning</i> , Johns Hopkins Center for Talented Youth Teaching Assistant (one session) Taught formal and informal logic to gifted high school students during an intensive three-week summer course
Summer 2007	<i>Logic: Principles of Reasoning</i> , Johns Hopkins Center for Talented Youth Teaching Assistant (two sessions) Taught formal and informal logic to gifted high school students during an intensive three-week summer course

As Preceptor

2014–15	BA Preceptor, Philosophy, University of Chicago Led a year-long workshop for students writing BA theses in philosophy
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2014–15 | BA Preceptor, Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago
Led a quarter-long seminar on writing research papers for students writing BA theses in the Public Policy Studies Program; met with students over the course of the year to discuss their progress and provide feedback on their research and writing

Advising

2013–14 | Ben Yu, “Reimagining the *Tractatus*: a discussion of early Wittgenstein and the imaginary numbers,” BA Thesis (History, Philosophy, and Sociology of Science and Medicine), University of Chicago

Pedagogical Training

Apr 2014 | Workshop: How Students Learn
Center for Teaching and Learning, University of Chicago

Sep 2013 | Workshop on Teaching in the College
Center for Teaching and Learning, University of Chicago

Dec 2012 | Overcoming Bottlenecks to Learning in Your Present and Future Courses
Center for Teaching and Learning, University of Chicago

Aug 2012 | Workshop on Course Design
Center for Teaching and Learning, University of Chicago

Jun 2012 | Seminar on Course Design
Center for Teaching and Learning, University of Chicago

May 2012 | Negotiating Discord/Teaching Contentious Topics
Center for Teaching and Learning, University of Chicago

Jul 2010 | Pedagogies of Writing
Center for Teaching and Learning, University of Chicago

Academic Service

Referee for *dialectica* (x4), *Mind & Language*, *Noûs*, *Philosophical Studies*

University Service

2014–15 | Assistant to the Director of Undergraduate Studies
Department of Philosophy, University of Chicago

2014–15 | Member, Student Advisory Committee to the Dean of Students
Division of the Humanities, University of Chicago

Sep 2013 | Invited Panelist, Teaching Your Own Course: The First Week
Workshop on Teaching in the College, University of Chicago

2010–13 | Coordinator, Wittgenstein Workshop, University of Chicago

Research Language

German | reading competence

Graduate Coursework (* denotes audit)

Philosophy of Language	Contextualism (Jason Bridges) Theory of Reference (Josef Stern) Quotation (Josef Stern) *Meaning (Josef Stern)
History of Analytic	Late Wittgenstein (David Finkelstein) Intentional Objects (Jocelyn Benoist) *Frege (Michael Kremer) *Russell (Michael Kremer)
Philosophy of Mind	Active Thoughts (Irada Kimhi) *Thinking and Being I (Irada Kimhi) *Thinking and Being II (Irada Kimhi) *Language and Self-Consciousness (David Finkelstein and Irada Kimhi)
Logic	Intermediate Logic (William Tait) *Advanced Logic (Kevin Davey)
Kant and 19th Century	Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics (Daniel Sutherland) *Hegel's Lectures on Fine Art (Robert Pippin) *Kant's Transcendental Deduction (James Conant and Robert Pippin) *Practical Reason (Stephen Engstrom)
Practical Philosophy	Bernard Williams on Ethics (Martha Nussbaum) Weakness of Will (Agnes Callard) *Acting and Thinking (Irada Kimhi) *Reasons (Jason Bridges)
Metaphysics	*Being and Creation (Irada Kimhi)
Ancient Philosophy	Aristotelian Change (Gabriel Richardson Lear) Plato's Aesthetics (Gabriel Richardson Lear) *Aristotle's <i>Metaphysics Gamma</i> (Marko Malink)

References

Michael Kremer	University of Chicago	kremer@uchicago.edu
Josef Stern	University of Chicago	j06s@uchicago.edu
James Shelley	Auburn University	shelljr@auburn.edu
Malte Willer	University of Chicago	willer@uchicago.edu
James Conant	University of Chicago	jconant@uchicago.edu

Dissertation Overview

My dissertation addresses an old problem for Frege's theory of thought, a problem that arises when we try to apply that theory to thoughts that ascribe propositional attitudes (e.g., the thought that Plato believes that Socrates is wise). To see the problem, we need to note, first, that Frege's theory of thought seems to involve two central claims. The first is that thoughts are composed of ways of thinking of objects and functions. The second is that the truth-conditions of a thought depend on the objects and functions of which its parts are ways of thinking. And we need to observe, second, that, since the truth-conditions of the thought that Plato believes that Socrates is wise depend on the thought that Socrates is wise, and so on its component parts (rather than on the object and function of which those parts are, respectively, ways of thinking), it follows that the thought that Socrates is wise is not a component part of the thought that Plato believes that Socrates is wise. Instead, the relevant part of the latter must be some *way of thinking of* the former. The problem, though, is that it nonetheless seems plain that a grasp of the thought that Plato believes that Socrates is wise requires a grasp of the thought that Socrates is wise. But the reasoning just adduced bars us from explaining this fact in the most natural way, namely, by appeal to the view that grasp of a thought requires grasp of each of its component parts. The seeming result is that we need either to provide some other explanation of the relevant fact or else to abandon Frege's theory of thought.

The aim of my dissertation is to show, first, that no other explanation of the relevant fact is available but, second, that we do not therefore need to abandon Frege's theory of thought. We need, instead, to *revise* it, by qualifying the claim that the truth-conditions of a thought depend on the objects and functions of which its parts are ways of thinking.

The argument of the dissertation can be divided into three parts. In the first, I argue that Frege's notion of *Bedeutung* ("reference," on the usual translation) involves a conflation of two distinct notions: (i) what an expression or thought-component intuitively *stands for* or *is about*; and (ii) what an expression or thought-component contributes to the truth-conditions of the sentences or thoughts in which it occurs. Reserving the term 'reference' for the former notion, and employing the term 'semantic value' for the latter, I argue that it is an open question, from the perspective of Frege's theory of language and thought, whether the semantic value of an expression or thought-component is always its reference. Moreover, sentences and thoughts that ascribe propositional attitudes, in particular, give us some reason to think that it is not.

In the second part of the argument, I show that contemporary defenders of the classical Fregean theory of propositional attitude ascriptions (on which reference and semantic value always coincide)—in particular, Tyler Burge, Saul Kripke, Christopher Peacocke, and Terence Parsons—have not provided a satisfactory explanation of the fact that grasp of the

thought that Plato believes that Socrates is wise requires grasp of the thought that Socrates is wise—their claims to the contrary notwithstanding. For (roughly speaking, and ignoring important differences between their respective views) their explanations all rest on an appeal to what Burge calls “the canonical sense function”—a function from ways of thinking to unique, “canonical,” ways of thinking of them. And, on close inspection, I argue, this notion of a canonical sense function simply falls apart.

In the final stage of the argument, I show that we can nonetheless rescue Frege’s theory of thought by abandoning his assumption that the reference of a thought-component is always its semantic value and insisting, on the contrary, that, in certain special cases, the semantic value of a thought-component is instead *itself* (in linguistic terms: in certain special cases, the semantic value of an expression is—not its reference, but—its *sense*). By taking this view, we allow ourselves to maintain *both* (i) that the thought that Socrates is wise is a component part of the thought that Plato believes that Socrates is wise *and* (ii) that the truth-conditions of the latter depend, not on the man Socrates, but on the relevant way of thinking of him, the one that figures as component part *both* of the thought that Socrates is wise *and* of the thought that Plato believes that Socrates is wise. Crucially, however, what explains this special feature of the truth-conditions of the thought that Plato believes that Socrates is wise is not that that thought contains some special component—some special way of thinking associated, in English, with the complementizer ‘that’—but, rather, that it has a special logical *form*. To see this, however, we need to see that, in general, the logical form of a sentence is *the way in which* its truth-conditions depend on its parts. But this conception of logical form is, I argue, perfectly defensible in general. It simply needs to be applied, properly, to thoughts that ascribe propositional attitudes.